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Abstract
This paper analyses R&D competition among firms with incomplete
information. In a two-stage stochastic R&D game, the first mover pos-
sesses private information regarding its R&D progress. The rival can only
observe its R&D investments, but not the actual R&D position. R&D
investment thus carries both investment and signalling effects. Both com-
plete information and signalling equilibria are possible in the second pe-
riod. For some parameter ranges, the equilibrium regime is endogenous
and depends on the firm’s position. The possibility of the signalling equi-
librium may induce under-investment in the first period, which is on the
contrary to the conclusion of entry deterrence literature.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies firms’ investment behaviour in a research and development
(R&D) game. In particular, how firms’ investment behaviour differs if there is
incomplete information regarding the rival’s research progress. In the literature
of R&D competition, many different issues have been studied. However, the
problem of incomplete information in a R&D race is not yet well addressed. In
reality, firms’ R&D progress is difficult to observe especially if there is some
unpatentable intermediate invention and if the firm cannot credibly announce
its technology advance without spill-overs of its research to the rivals.
To emphasise the unobservable R&D progress, we adopt a multi-period R&D
game with an intermediate invention. In this model, firms’ past R&D invest-
ments determine their current positions. This setting is different from games
with memoryless patent races.
There are two elements in the model. The first one is the R&D competition
game and how past investments and the rival’s progress affect a firm’s R&D
decision. The second element included is asymmetric information. With asym-
metric information, R&D investment not only enables the firm to advance in
the patent race, it also acts as an instrument to manipulate the rival’s belief.
The first element relates to the entry deterrence and commitment literature.
Firms’ incentive to invest depends on if the investments are strategic substitutes
or complements as documented in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). If increasing
investment makes the rival tougher, firms may want to be less aggressive. This
corresponds to Fudenberg and Tirole’s puppy dog strategy. If, on the other
hand, aggressive investment softens competition, the firm may want to over-
invest. In Fudenberg and Tirole’s taxonomy, this is the top dog strategy. Other
examples include Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985). Athey
and Schmutzler (2001) study a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing
investment. They characterise a few strategic effects which are present in the
current paper and will be discussed later. In their paper, they compare the
leading and following firms’ incentives to invest for games with strategic substi-
tutes and discuss the conditions for the results to be extended to games with
strategic complementarity.
In our model, after the first period, given the realised positions, the second
2
period competition exhibits some similar properties as discussed in Athey and
Schmutzler. Firms’ investments increase with its own progress and decrease
with the rival’s progress. However, different from what they conclude in the
paper, weak increasing dominance1 does not always hold in this model.
Note that although investments are cumulative and firms invest in the two
periods to attain the final goal, with the possibility to advance for two steps in
the second period, firms’ own investments in the two periods can be complements
or substitutes. Since firms can complete the whole research project in the second
period, second period investments can be substitutes for investments in the first
period. However, it is more difficult for firms to complete the entire research
project in the second period. The two period investments are complements if the
firm advances one step at a time. It is shown that depending on the parameter
values, both under and over-investments in R&D are possible in equilibrium.
In the first period, the second mover adopts a top dog or lean and hungry look
strategy.
The second element relates to the signalling property of the game. The most
well-known signalling models are Spence’s 1974 job market model and Milgrom
and Roberts’ 1982 limit pricing model. The idea is that with private information,
without any cheap talk mechanisms, the information owner has to send out
costly signals to convey information to its rival. In the signalling literature, a
player typically has the incentive to send the signal that it is a strong type.
High productivity worker over-invests in education in a separating equilibrium
in Spence model, and firms have the incentive to charge a lower price in Milgrom
and Roberts. There are some papers which construct equilibrium where firms
under-invest to signal its type and hence such signals are not necessarily costly
to the sender. Examples include Aoki and Reitman (1992) and Orzach and
Tauman (1996).2 In these two models, firms still do so in order to convince the
rival that they are the strong type.
In this paper, in the second period sub-game, as in most signalling models, we
find that the weak type has the incentive to mimic the strong type’s behaviour
and thus induces the strong type to over-invest in a separating equilibrium. This
effect reinforces the strategic effect from firms’ downward sloping best responses
1Weak increasing dominance prevails if the leading firm invests more than the lagging firm.
2Aoki and Reitman focus on a partial pooling equilibrium.
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and makes the first mover invest more than the Stackelberg leader level. Both
complete information and signalling equilibria exist in the second period and we
identify the conditions for the second period game to deviate from the complete
information equilibrium.
Furthermore, for some parameter ranges, the second period game regime
depends on the signal receiver’s type. The over-investment in the signalling
equilibrium hurt both firms. When the second game regime depends on the
second mover’s type, and thus on its first period R&D investment, the possibil-
ity of getting into the signalling game distorts the second mover’s first period
behaviour. Both under-investment and over-investment are possible in equilib-
rium.3
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We review some related liter-
ature in the second section. The set up of the model is presented in the third
section. We first work out a benchmark case of complete information where
firms’ positions are observable to the rival. We then proceed with the signalling
equilibrium analysis, followed by discussions and conclusions.
2 Related Literature
There are a few different strands of models which study the technology inno-
vation problem. The most popular and recent one is that of a patent race.4
As noted in Grossman and Shapiro (1987), Such a modelling captures some
characteristics of R&D competition. For example, in both a race and R&D
competition, the largest prize is awarded to the first one to cross a well defined
finishing line and competitors adjust their efforts according to their relative
positions to their rivals.
Many different questions have been analysed in the framework of a patent
race.5 Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980), and
Reiganum (1981, 1982a, b) are models with memoryless or Poisson patent races
where firms’ probability of making a discovery today conditional on no one else
3However, there is no signalling in the first period since both firms start at position 0.
4The other two main streams of models are deterministic auction models and contest
models.
5A good survey of earlier literature is in Reinganum (1989).
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having done so depends only on their current level of R&D investment. In
such models, firms’ accumulated R&D or knowledge stock has no effect on its
current likelihood of discovery. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) consider a deter-
ministic model where an arbitrarily small advantage allows the leading firm to
act as a monopolist and still preempts entry. Fudenberg et al. (1983) have
a model with information lag. Firms invest simultaneously and only observe
each other’s investment with a time lag. By introducing this information lags
and leapfrogging, it is possible for the technology laggard to win the R&D race.
They conclude that the possibility of leapfrogging is important for the lagging
firm to stay in the race. Grossman and Shapiro (1987) have a two stage model
based on Lee and Wilde with firms adjusting their R&D investments depend-
ing on their relative positions in the race. The general conclusion is that R&D
competition is most fierce when firms are close in the race. Doraszelski (2003)
builds a simulation model with knowledge accumulation and emphasises on the
technology follower’s catch up behaviour.
In this paper, we specify an intermediate invention6 following Grossman
and Shapiro to indicate technology leader and follower. The probability of
leapfrogging is crucial to keep the technology laggard active in the game and is
also included in the modelling. Different from the conclusions in Grossman and
Shapiro, in our model, firms are most aggressive when the positions are uneven.
There are a few papers which incorporate elements of incomplete informa-
tion. One that addresses a similar question as this paper is Aoki and Reitman
(1992). They propose a model with two-sided private information where firms’
initial marginal costs are not observable to the rival. Firms play a Cournot
game in the final product market. They focus on a partial pooling equilibrium
where firms under-invest in R&D. This paper complements the analysis of Aoki
and Reitman. In their model, firms have initial private information about their
costs. The modelling in this paper captures the first period analysis which is
omitted in Aoki and Reitman. Finally, Aoki and Reitman employs a determin-
istic R&D technology. Reinganum (1983) demonstrates that the results from
a patent race could be quite different depending on if the invention process is
6Throughout this paper, the words invention and innovation are used interchangeably, so
are the words inventor and innovator.
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deterministic or stochastic. The R&D technology is assumed to be stochastic
in the paper. Firms move sequentially in this model to emphasise the signalling
game. We suppress the product market competition to focus on the patent
race. However, the profit setting is general enough to consider different market
structures.
There are some papers which deal with firms’ information disclosure de-
cisions. Ulph(1998), Go´salbez and Díez(2000), and Rosenkranz (2001) study
firms’ information disclosure incentive in a research joint venture . Anton and
Yao (1999) study firms’ decision on information disclosure with imperfect patent
protection and the possibility of imitation. In their model, only the leading
firm engages in R&D. Other papers on information disclosure include Admati
and Pfleiderer (2000), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Shin (1998), and Jansen
(2002a, b). All the papers deal with the case where some credible announcement
is available. If firms are willing, they can simply convey its private information
to the rival. In our model, we assume that such an announcement instrument
is not available. Cheap talks about one’s progress are never credible. The first
mover can only manipulate the rival’s belief through adjusting its R&D effort
in the second period. Therefore R&D investment carries both investment and
signalling effects.
3 The Model
The model is a two-stage R&D race game. The first stage is a primary research
stage which is not necessary for the final invention but the success brings one
closer to the final goal. This setting defines the technology leader and laggard
and also emphasises the effect of a firm’s past R&D on its current investment.
There are two firms, A and B, with A being the first mover. To simplify the
problem, we analyse an one-sided private information model with A possessing
private information regarding its position. A can observe B’s R&D progress.7
A firm’s R&D progress is illustrated by its position in the R&D race, which
is defined as si ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Position si = 0 indicates that firm i is at the starting
point of the R&D process, si = 1 indicates that firm i has finished the primary
7We have some discussion of this set up in Section 4.
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research, and si = 2 indicates that firm i has reached the finishing line for the
invention and a patent is granted. Hereafter, in the second period, we term
firms which have finished the primary research after the first period as type one
and those which stayed at position zero as type zero. We assume that there is
no uncertainty and delay in patent application.
The timing of the moves is illustrated in Figure 1. In the beginning of the
game, the first mover’s type is chosen by Nature. With probability θ, A is a
type one. Otherwise, A stays at position zero. The probability distribution of
Nature’s move is common knowledge and A’s true position remains its private
information. B then makes its first period investment. In the second period,
knowing B’s position, A makes its investment. After observing A’s investment,
B updates its belief about sA1 and makes its second period investment.
 
 
Period 1 Period 2
N a tu r e m ove s a n d d e t e rm in e s
A’ s ty p e , w h ich is k n ow n to A,
b u t n o t t o B.
T h e p r o b d i s t r ib u t io n o f N a tu r e ’ s
m ove , ρ
(
sA1 = 1
)
= θ,
i s c om m on k n ow le d g e .
K n ow in g b o th sA1 a n d sB1 ,
A in v e s t s rA2
H o ld in g b e l ie f θ,
B in v e s t s rB1
K n ow in g sB1 a n d u p d a t in g b e l i e f
fo r sA1 a f t e r s e e in g rA2 ,
B in v e s t s rB2
Figure 1: Timing of the moves
The R&D technology is as follows: In the first period, with investment
rB1, B moves up to position 1 with probability rB1. Otherwise, it stays at
position zero. In the second period, firms can move forward for two steps.
Therefore, it is possible that a type zero could leapfrog a type one. Denote the
probability of firm i advancing x steps, x ∈ {0, 1, 2}, by fxi . Assume that as ri
increases, the probability of firm i staying at the same position, f0i , decreases and
the probability of advancing two steps, f2i , is non-decreasing.
8 In this model,
8We do not impose the restriction that f1
i
should be non-decreasing. If s1 = 0, only the
7
we construct a discrete probability distribution for fxi from a nested Binomial
distribution. With investment ri2, firm i moves forward with probability ri2.
If the firm moves forward, with probability 1 − q, it moves forward for one
step, and with probability q, it moves forward for two steps. Therefore, with
investment ri2, f
0
i = (1− ri2), f1i = ri2 (1− q), and f2i = ri2q. The parameter
q can be thought of as some measure for the productivity difference between the
two types of firms.
A firm’s gross profit depends on its own and the rival’s R&D success, πi ∈
{πm, πd, 0}. A firm gets the monopoly profit, πM , if it is the only one to reach
position two at the end of the second period. Firms get the duopoly profit,
πd, if they both reach the finishing line in the end of the game. Firms receive
positive profit only when they complete the final goal.9 The game finishes after
two periods, whether or not firms have reached the finishing line.
Let C : r → R+ be the cost function for R&D investment for both firms.
Assumption 1 R&D costs in the two periods are additively separable, Ci =
ci1 + ci2, and take the quadratic functional form, Ci = kr
2
i1/2 + kr
2
i2/2.
Assumption 2
πm > 2πd and πm <
k
2
.
The first part of the Assumption 2 guarantees firms’ incentive to be the
monopolist. This second part of the assumption guarantees that the solutions
given by the first-order condition are interior. Given there is no fixed cost in
investment, firms’ marginal incentive to invest is always positive at rit = 0.
To make sure that the investment level is less than one, a sufficient condition
is that even with maximum gain, firms do not invest ri = 1. The maximum
gain for firms is the monopoly profit. Given ri1, the condition follows that
πm < Ci|ri2=1 = kr2i1/2 + k/2. A sufficient condition for this is πm < k/2.
probability of moving two steps matters. If s1 = 1, advancing one step is as good as advancing
two steps. It could be specified that for some certain range of ri, the possibility of moving
two steps increases while the possibility of advancing one step decreases. In that case, firms
can target the size of innovation. This is left for future extension.
9This can be thought of as some normalisation.
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3.1 Complete information equilibrium
To analyse the effects of asymmetric information and signalling in this model, we
first work out the complete information equilibrium as the benchmark. Solve the
game backwards and start with the second period analysis when the first period
positions are realised. Let δ ≡ πm − πd. Note that firms only have positive
profit if they finish the patent race. Once a firm has made the discovery, it gets
either πm or πd depending on the rival’s position. Therefore, the larger δ is, the
stronger firms’ incentives to deter the rival’s investment.
3.1.1 Second period analysis
B’s investment Index firms’ positions at the end of the first period by (sA1, sB1).
For position (0, 0), B’s expected profit is
π00B = f
2
B
((
1− f2A
)
πm + f
2
Aπd
)− kr2B2
2
= qrB2 (πm − qrA2δ)− kr
2
B2
2
. (1)
For position (1, 0),
π10B = f
2
B
(
f0Aπm +
(
1− f0A
)
πd
)− kr2B2
2
= qrB2 (πm − rA2δ)− kr
2
B2
2
(2)
For position (0, 1),
π01B =
(
1− f0B
) ((
1− f2A
)
πm + f
2
Aπd
)− kr2B2
2
= rB2 (πm − qrA2δ)− kr
2
B2
2
. (3)
For position (1, 1),
π11B =
(
1− f0B
) (
f0Aπm +
(
1− f0A
)
πd
)− kr2B2
2
= rB2 (πm − rA2δ)− kr
2
B2
2
. (4)
A’s investment For position (0, 0),
π00A = qrA2 (πm − qrB2δ)−
kr2A2
2
. (5)
For position (1, 0),
π10A = rA2 (πm − qrB2δ)−
kr2A2
2
. (6)
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For position (0, 1),
π01A = qrA2 (πm − rB2δ)−
kr2A2
2
. (7)
For position (1, 1),
π11A = rA2 (πm − rB2δ)−
kr2A2
2
. (8)
We summarise B’s best responses, A’s optimal investments, and equilibrium
profit levels indexed by their positions in the following table.
A\B 0 1
0
BR00B = q
πm−rA2δq
k
.
π00B =
1
2q
2π2m
(k2−q4δ2−q2δk)2
(k2−2q4δ2)2k .
r00A2 = qπm
k−q2δ
k2−2q4δ2 .
π00A =
1
2q
2π2m
(k−q2δ)2
(k2−2q4δ2)k .
BR01B =
πm−rA2δq
k
.
π01B =
1
2π
2
m
(k2−q2δ2−q2δk)2
(k2−2q2δ2)2k .
r01A2 = qπm
k−δ
k2−2q2δ2 .
π01A =
1
2q
2π2m
(k−δ)2
(k2−2q2δ2)k .
1
BR10B = q
πm−rA2δ
k
.
π10B =
1
2q
2π2m
(k2−q2δ2−δk)2
(k2−2q2δ2)2k .
r10A2 = πm
k−q2δ
k2−2q2δ2 .
π10A =
1
2π
2
m
(k−q2δ)2
(k2−2q2δ2)k .
BR11B =
πm−rA2δ
k
.
π11B =
1
2π
2
m
(k2−δ2−δk)2
(k2−2δ2)2k .
r11A2 = πm
k−δ
k2−2δ2 .
π11A =
1
2π
2
m
(k−δ)2
(k2−2δ2)k .
Table 1: Second period investments and profits.
Remark 1 Firms’ second period investments increase with its own R&D progress
and decrease with the rival’s progress, r01B2 ≥
{
r00B2, r
11
B2
} ≥ r10B2, r10A2 ≥ {r00A2, r11A2} ≥
r01A2. When A is the technology leader, A always invests more than B, r
10
A ≥
r10B . When B is the technology leader, B invests more than A, r
01
B ≥ r01A , if
δ ≤ 1−q+
√
(1−q)(5−q)
2q k.
Weak increasing dominance holds for A but does not always hold for B. It
is straightforward that r10A ≥ r10B since a technology lead reinforces A’s in-
centive to over-invest as a Stackelberg leader. However, when B is ahead,
the two effects work in different directions. Note that if q ≤ (−1 +√13) /3,(
1− q +√(1− q) (5− q)) k/ (2q) ≥ k/2, and r01B ≥ r01A for the relevant δ range.
The condition says that if q is small, type zero of A wouldn’t find it worthwhile
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to invest too much given its own low productivity compared with type one of
B and weak increasing dominance holds for B. However, if the probability of
leapfrogging is high and if δ is high, the Stackelberg effect dominates and type
zero of A invests more than type one of B. As q increases, this δ required de-
creases and makes it is likely that r01A ≥ r01B since the productivity difference
between the two types decreases.
3.1.2 First period analysis
In the first period, since B is the second mover, B knows A’s position when
making its investment decision in the complete information framework.
If A is a type zero:
πB|sA=0 = rB1π01B + (1− rB1)π00B −
kr2B1
2
= rB1
(
πm − qr01A2δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − qr00A2δ
)2
2k
− kr
2
B1
2
. (9)
The FOC gives
rB1|sA=0 =
π2m
2k2
((
1− q2δ k − δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− q2δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q4δ2
)2)
. (10)
If A is a type one
πB|sA=1 = rB1π11B + (1− rB1)π10B −
kr2B1
2
= rB1
(
πm − δr11A
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − r10A δ
)2
2k
− kr
2
B1
2
. (11)
The FOC gives the optimal R&D investment as
rB1|sA=1 =
π2m
2k2
((
1− δ k − δ
k2 − 2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2)
. (12)
B invests more when facing a type zero if(
πm − qr01A2δ
)2 − q2 (πm − qr00A2δ)2 ≥ (πm − δr11A )2 − q2 (πm − r10A δ)2 .
Or (
1− q2δ k − δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− q2δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q4δ2
)2
≥
(
1− δ k − δ
k2 − 2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2
.
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Let
∆ ≡
(
1− q2δ k − δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− q2δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q4δ2
)2
−
((
1− δ k − δ
k2 − 2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2)
. (13)
B invests more when facing a type zero of A if ∆ > 0. The marginal benefit
of B’s investment depends on A’s type and A’s investment in the second period.
GivenB’s type, type one ofA is more aggressive than type zero. Since π01B ≥ π11B ,
B has higher incentive to invest when facing a type zero. However, by investing
more, B forgoes the chance of getting π00B (π
10
B ) when facing a type zero (one).
Given that π00B > π
10
B , B also has more disincentive to invest when facing a type
zero of A. From simulation results, the first effect always dominates and B is
more aggressive when facing a type zero of A.
3.2 Incomplete information analysis
We now turn to the case where B cannot observe A’s position. Being the
first mover with its private information, A’s second period investment has both
investment and signalling effects. B’s belief about A’s position is updated after
observing A’s investment in the second period. The equilibrium should satisfy
the following conditions. Let µB denote the believe B holds for A to be a type
one.
1. The equilibrium should be sequential.
2. The equilibrium for B consists of a pair of investment strategy and belief,
(rB, µB), with B’s strategy being optimal given A’s strategy, B’s own
position, and B’s belief about A’s position.
3. In equilibrium, A’s strategy should be optimal given A and B’s positions
and B’s best responses.
4. B’s belief is derived from Bayes’ rule wherever possible.
In a separating equilibrium, the incentive constraints are satisfied for both
types of A so that neither type has the incentive to mimic the other one. Upon
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observing the equilibrium investment level, B correctly identifies A’s type and
assigns beliefs 0 or 1. In a pooling equilibrium, both types of A choose the
same level of rA2. B learns nothing from observing rA2 and still holds its prior
belief θ. Since both types of B are more aggressive if A’s first period research
is not successful, and since firms’ R&D investments are strategic substitutes,
only type zero of A has the incentive to mimic the behaviour of type one. The
incentive constraint for type one is always satisfied.
Given A and B’s positions, it can be verified that the single crossing property
and thus the stability condition for the equilibrium holds. For any given rA2,
(∂rB2/∂rA2)|π1
A
− (∂rB2/∂rA2)|π0
A
> 0. It is less costly for type one of A to
increase R&D investment.
3.2.1 Equilibrium refinements
As is common in signalling models, there are a large number of sequential equi-
libria in this game, including separating and pooling ones. The existence of
multiple equilibria is due to the freedom of specifying the signal receiver’s off-
equilibrium beliefs. By strengthening restrictions on off-equilibrium beliefs, we
can pin down a subset of equilibria which are more plausible. We use the re-
finement concepts proposed in Cho and Kreps (1987).10 Consider the following
refinements for the off-equilibrium beliefs.
Criterion 1 Suppose that for a type h of A, investment levels rA and r
′
A are
such that πh [rA, RB [sA = 0]] > πh [r
′
A, RB [sA = 1]], then in any Nash equilib-
rium, it must be possible to sustain the equilibrium outcome with beliefs that put
zero probability on investment level r′A being selected by type h.
This is essentially Cho and Kreps’ Intuitive Criterion. Since given an invest-
ment level r, the best A can do is to convince B that it is a type one, if what A
gets from investing rA when B thinks it is a type zero (the worst outcome from
investing rA) is greater than what it gets from investing r
′
A when B thinks it
is a type one (the best outcome from investing r′A), type h of A would never
choose to invest r′A. Therefore upon seeing r
′
A, B should never assess that it
comes from a type h of A.
10The formulation here is more closely related to Kreps (1990).
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Criterion 2 Fix a sequential equilibrium and let π∗h be the profit level at this
equilibrium for type h of A. Suppose that an investment level r′A is such that
πh [r
′
A, rB [sA = 1]] < π
∗
h, then it must be possible to sustain the given equilib-
rium with beliefs that put zero probability on investment level r′A being chosen
by type h of A.
This is essentially Cho and Kreps’ Equilibrium Domination Test. The game
has a separating equilibrium if there exists an equilibrium
(
rˆ0sA , rˆ
1s
A
)
with type
zero having no incentive to mimic the behaviour of type one.
Definition 1 Let f [rA] be the profit difference for type zero of A from mimick-
ing type one and from investing the optimal level and being recognised as a type
zero. That is,
f [rA|sB ] = πA
[
rA, BR
1s
B |sA = 0, sB
]− πA [r0sA , BR0sB |sA = 0, sB] .
Furthermore, denote the investment level that solves f [rA] = 0 for rA > r
0s
A as
rˆ1sA . That is, f
[
rˆ1sA
]
= 0.
The function f [rA] gives the gains from mimicking for type zero of A against
its optimal investment when it is recognised as a type zero. When f [rA] ≤ 0,
type zero has no incentive to mimic the behaviour of type one. The profit level,
πA
[
r0sA , R
0s
B |sA = 0, sB
]
, can be thought of as the reservation profit. Type zero
only has the incentive to mimic if what it gets by deviating from r0sA is greater
than this reservation profit. This function is quadratic in rA. There are two
values of rA which satisfy f [rA] = 0, one less than r
0s
A and one greater than r
0s
A .
We term the one greater than r0A as rˆ
1s
A . Given the single crossing property, for
rA < r
0s
A , type one of A would prefer investing r
1s
A even when it faces the risk
of imitation. This could not be sustained as a separating equilibrium. Given
the quadratic functional form, f [rA] > 0 for r
0s
A ≤ rA < rˆ1sA and f [rA] ≤ 0 for
rA ≥ rˆ1sA .
When facing a a type zero of B,
f [rA|sB = 0] = qπm
(
rA2 − r00A
)− q2δ (rA2R10B − r00A R00B )
−k
2
[
r2A2 −
(
r00A
)2]
. (14)
The gains from mimicking can be decomposed into three parts. The first one
is the direct investment effect which says that as rA2 increases, the probability
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of A getting πm increases. The second term is the strategic effect which says
that the more aggressive B is against type one of A decreases the gains from
mimicking. On the other hand, the more aggressive B is towards type zero of A
increases the gain. The last term is the investment cost. As rA2 increases, the
cost of investment increases. Similarly, the gains from mimicking when facing a
type one of B is
f [rA|sB = 1] = qπm
(
rA2 − r00A
)− qδ (rA2R11B − r00A R01B )
−k
2
[
r2A2 −
(
r01A
)2]
. (15)
The equilibrium deviates from the complete information equilibrium if the
gains from mimicking is sufficiently large.
Lemma 1 With Criterion 1 and 2, if the incentive constraints are satisfied at(
r0sA , r
1s
A
)
, the separating equilibrium is that type zero chooses r0sA and type one
chooses r1sA . This equilibrium is the same as the one in the complete informa-
tion equilibrium. If type zero’s incentive constraint is violated at
(
r0sA , r
1s
A
)
, the
separating equilibrium consists of type zero choosing r0sA and type one choosing
rˆ1sA .
Proof. If the incentive constraint is satisfied at
(
r0sA , r
1s
A
)
, that is, if f
[
r1sA
] ≤
0, type zero has no incentive to mimic type one. The optimal levels solved by the
FOCs are the equilibrium investment levels for the two types. If the incentive
constraint is violated at
(
r0sA , r
1s
A
)
, that is, if f
[
r1sA
]
> 0, type zero has incentive
to mimic type one when the latter invests r1sA . To separate itself from type zero,
type one needs to invest more so that type zero does not have the incentive to
imitate. Type one chooses the investment level which maximises its profit along
B’s best response against type one, subject to the condition that type zero does
not strictly prefer this chosen investment level to r0sA .
From Definition 1, for investment levels greater than rˆ1sA , f [rA] < 0. There-
fore, B forms the belief µB
(
rA|rA > rˆ1sA
)
= 1 for rA ≥ rˆ1sA . In equilibrium type
one of A invests rˆ1sA and type zero invests r
0s
A .
The complete information equilibrium and signalling equilibrium for a type
one of B are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 respectively.
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Figure 2: Complete information equilibrium
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Figure 3: Signalling equilibrium
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As Cho and Kreps demonstrate, there are no pooling equilibria that can
survive the criteria.
Lemma 2 With Criterion 1, there is no pooling equilibrium in this game.
Proof. After the first period, µB = θ. In a pooling equilibrium, B learns
nothing from A’s second period investment and still holds its prior belief. For
any pooling equilibria, given B’s type, both types of A face an average best re-
sponse weighted by θ, RB |s = θR1sB +(1− θ)R0sB . With single-crossing property,
for any pooling equilibrium, rPA , there exists some out of equilibrium investment
level, r
′
A > r
P
A such that π
1
A
[
r
′
A
]
> π1A
[
rPA
]
, and π0A
[
rPA
]
> π0A
[
r
′
A
]
. Hence by
Criterion 1, type one of A can safely choose r
′
A and B should form the belief
µB
[
r
′
A
]
= 1. This breaks any proposed pooling equilibrium.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.


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
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
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k
R01B2
R11B2
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Figure 4: Pooling equilibrium
3.2.2 Second period game regimes
Proposition 1 The realisation of the second period equilibrium game regime
depends on parameter values and B’s type. The second period game regime is
described in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 5 in (q, δ) space.
Proof. See the appendix.
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q ≤
√
3
2 Complete information regime
Case 1
q ≥
√
3
2 , δ
2 ≤ k
2
(
2q−1−
√
4q2−3
)
4q
Complete information for both types of B.
Case 2
k2
(
2q−1−
√
4q2−3
)
4q ≤ δ2 ≤
k2
(
2q−1+
√
4q2−3
)
4q , δ
2 ≤ k
2
(
2q−1−
√
4q2−3
)
4q3
Complete information for sB = 0 and signalling for sB = 1.
Case 3
k2
(
2q−1−
√
4q2−3
)
4q3 ≤ δ2 ≤
k2
(
2q−1+
√
4q2−3
)
4q , δ
2 ≤ k24
Signalling for both types of B.
Case 4
k2
(
2q−1−
√
4q2−3
)
4q3 ≤ δ2 ≤ k
2
4 ,
k2
(
2q−1+
√
4q2−3
)
4q ≤ δ2
Complete information for sB = 1 and signalling for sB = 0
Case 5
q ≥
√
3
2 ,
k2
(
2q−1+
√
4q2−3
)
4q ≤ δ2 ≤
k2
(
2q−1−
√
4q2−3
)
4q3 , δ
2 ≤ k24
Complete information for both types of B.
Table 2: Second period game regimes
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Figure 5: Second period game regime
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Remark 2 As q increases, the range of parameter for the signalling regime
widens.
As q increases, the lower bounds for the signalling case when facing two
types of B both decrease and the upper bounds both increase. Therefore, as q
increases, the range of parameter for the signalling regime widens.
It is uncertain whether or not rˆ00A ≥ rˆ01A . Note that π00A ≥ π01A . The reserva-
tion profit when facing a type zero of B is higher. If we plot f [rA|sB] against
rA, for small rA, gains from mimicking is higher when facing a type one of
B. The benefit of increasing rA comes from two effects. The first one is that
an increase of rA has a direct investment effect on A’s expected profit. The
second effect is that an increase of rA has a strategic effect of deterring B’s
investment. Compare the two effects for type zero of A when facing two types
of B. When facing a type zero, an increase of rA2 brings about higher direct
investment gain. However, the strategic gain is higher when facing a type one
of B given its steeper best response. When rA2 is small, ∂f [rA|sB = 1] /∂rA ≤
∂f [rA|sB = 0] /∂rA and the first effect dominates. When πm/ (2δ) ≤ rA, the
strategic effect dominates and ∂f [rA|sB = 1] /∂rA ≥ ∂f [rA|sB = 0] /∂rA.
The effects of parameters on second period game regimes We first
analyse δ’s effects on f [rA|sB ]. As δ increases, given rA2, the strategic gain
from mimicking is higher when facing a type one of B given its steeper best
response. For small δ, the game enters the signalling regime first when facing a
type one of B. On the other hand, given rA2, as δ increases, π
01
A increases faster
than π00A in the relevant δ range. This increase of the reservation profit makes
it costly to mimic when facing a type one of B. Therefore, when δ gets large
as in Case 4, the game falls back into the complete information regime when
facing a type one of B .
Take the partial derivative of f [rA|sB = 0] with respect to q, the marginal
benefit of increasing q is
rA2πm − 3q2rA2πm − rA2δ
k
δ,
which is decreasing in q for the relevant q range. The marginal benefit of an
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increase of q on f (rA|sB = 1) is
rA2
(
πm − πm − rA2δ
k
δ
)
.
This is independent of q since q does not affect type one of B’s probability of
reaching position 2 and A’s own profit is linear in q. When q is small, the
marginal benefit of increasing q is higher when facing a type zero of B. When
q gets big, since increasing q increases type zero of B’s chance of success as
well, the marginal benefit when facing a type one of B dominates. For the q
range relevant for the signalling regime, q ≥ √3/2, the marginal benefit from
increasing q is higher when A faces a type one of B.
The exception for this occurs in Case 4 where for intermediate q values and
sufficiently large δ, the game gets into the signalling regime first when facing a
type zero of B. Intuitively, we need sufficiently large q to have the signalling
regime since type zero of A would only have the incentive to mimic when q is
large. Here, we need a even larger q to make sure that A always prefers to
get into the signalling regime when facing a type one. The reason is that the
magnitude of q affects type zero’s productivity for both A and B. When q is in
this intermediate range and when δ is sufficiently large, type zero of A does not
find it worthwhile to mimic when B is a type one since its own productivity is
too low compared with type one of B. Therefore in Case 4, the second period
game is in the signalling regime when facing a type zero of B and is in the
complete information regime when facing a type one of B.
3.2.3 B’s first period investment
In the first period, with probability θ, B faces a type one of A. We discuss B’s
first period investment behaviour according to the five cases listed in Table 2.
We are especially interested in how the possibility of the signalling game in the
second period affects B’s first period investment.
Case 1 The second period game is in the complete information regime when
facing both types of B. The optimal profit and investment levels in this case are
the weighted average of the relevant levels in the complete information analysis
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given in Equations 9 to 12.11
πB = (1− θ)π0sB + θπ1sB
= (1− θ)
[
rB1
(
πm − qr01A2δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − qr00A2δ
)2
2k
]
+θ
[
rB1
(
πm − δr11A
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − r10A δ
)2
2k
]
−kr
2
B1
2
. (16)
Case 2 The second period game is in the complete information regime when
facing a type zero of B and is in the signalling regime when facing a type one.
πB = θ
[
rB1π
11
B + (1− rB1)π10B
]
+ (1− θ) [rB1π01B + (1− rB1)π00B ]− kr2B12
= θ
[
rB1
(
πm − rˆ11A δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − r10A δ
)2
2k
]
+(1− θ)
[
rB1
(
πm − qr01A2δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − qr00A2δ
)2
2k
]
−kr
2
B1
2
. (17)
Case 3 The second period game is in the signalling regime when facing both
types of B.
πB = θ
[
rB1π
11
B + (1− rB1)π10B
]
+ (1− θ) [rB1π01B + (1− rB1)π00B ]− kr2B12
= θ
[
rB1
(
πm − rˆ11A δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − rˆ10A2δ
)2
2k
]
+(1− θ)
[
rB1
(
πm − qr01A2δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − qr00A2δ
)2
2k
]
−kr
2
B1
2
. (18)
Case 4 The second period game is in the complete information regime when
11The equilibrium investment levels are given in the appendix.
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facing type one of B and is in the signalling regime when facing a type zero.
πB = θ
[
rB1π
11
B + (1− rB1)π10B
]
+ (1− θ) [rB1π01B + (1− rB1)π00B ]− kr2B12
= θ
[
rB1
(
πm − r11A2δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − rˆ10A2δ
)2
2k
]
+(1− θ)
[
rB1
(
πm − qr01A2δ
)2
2k
+ (1− rB1) q2
(
πm − qr00A2δ
)2
2k
]
−kr
2
B1
2
(19)
Case 5 The second period game is in the complete information regime when
facing both types. The analysis is the same as in Case 1.
For the five possible cases, there are two cases where the second period
game regime depends on B’s type. In Case 2, the second period game is in the
complete information (signalling) regime if B is a type zero (one). On the other
hand, in Case 4, the game is in the complete information (signalling) regime if
B is a type one (zero).
Proposition 2 B’s first period investment is the lowest in Case 2 and the high-
est in Case 4.
Proof. With the same function for marginal cost of investment and given
that the marginal benefit (MB) is constant since profit is linear in rB1, we
only need to compare the MB in the five cases. Since rˆ1sA ≥ r1sA , it fol-
lows that MB(case 4) ≥MB(case 1, 5) ≥MB(case 3) ≥MB(case 2). Therefore
r∗B1 (case 4) ≥ r∗B1 (case 1, 5) ≥ r∗B1 (case 3) ≥ r∗B1 (case 2).
In order to avoid the signalling regime in the second period, for parameter
values given in Case 4, B invests more than the complete information equilib-
rium level. On the other hand, for parameter values given in Case 2 and 3, B
invests less than in the complete information regime. B’s under-investment in
Case 3 is a result of A’s more aggressive response in the second period due to
the realisation of the signalling regime. For Case 2, B under-invests in order
to avoid signalling regime in the second period. With asymmetric information,
this model gives under-investment as an equilibrium which is different from the
general conclusion of the entry deterrence literature.
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Since investments are strategic substitutes in the second period, a firm’s
investment carries negative externality to its rival. Even without asymmetric
information, firms over-invest in the second period compared with the socially
optimal investment levels when firms’ joint profit is maximised.12
Lemma 3 B’s first period investment has negative externality on A’s profit.
In the complete information benchmark, B invests too much in the first period
compared with the investment level which maximises firms’ joint profit.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 4 In Case 2 and Case 3 where B invests less than the complete in-
formation regime in the first period, the existence of asymmetric information
partially corrects B’s first period over-investment.
In Case 2 and Case 3 where B invests less than in the complete information
equilibrium, asymmetric information gives two welfare effects. There is a welfare
gain from B’s less aggressive first period investment which partially corrects the
negative externality rB1 has on πA. There is a welfare loss due to the possibility
of the second period signalling equilibrium and A’s over-investment. We need
to trade off gains from B’s less aggressive first period behaviour and A’s more
aggressive second period behaviour if the signalling equilibrium occurs. Our
numerical simulations suggest that the gain is not enough to offeset to the loss.
4 Discussions
4.1 One-sided private information
We assume that the second mover can observe the first mover’s R&D invest-
ment, but not its position. It corresponds to the situation where there is no
means of announcement available. We assume that cheap talks regarding R&D
progress are never credible. The second mover, however, can observe the first
mover’s R&D expenditure through annual reports, employment, or laboratory
constructions.
12There are other candidates for social welfare measure in R&D games. For example, a
popular alternative is to maximise the speed of innovation.
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It is a one-sided private information game. The first mover can observe the
second mover’s R&D outcome after the first period. There is no signalling for
B in the second period since the game finishes after B’s second period invest-
ment. By making B’s position known to A, it helps focus on A’s second period
investment behaviour. Furthermore, A’s first period position is determined by
Nature. We do not model A’s first period investment choice in the model to
emphasise on B’s first period behaviour. Although A’s first period investment
determines B’s prior belief regarding A’s progress, B’s belief is updated after
observing A’s second period investment. We analysed the story of two-sided pri-
vate information where both firms’ research positions are private information
with endogenous investments for both firms in both periods in a working paper,
Kao (2002). It was shown that B’s first period investment affects A’s belief in
the second period and therefore impacts on the realisation of the second period
game regime. Most of the effects carry over to the one-sided private information
model.
4.2 Asymmetric q for two firms
The probability of moving two steps is crucial in the analysis for the signalling
equilibrium. The parameter q tells us the productivity difference for two types
of firms and therefore how costly it is for type zero of A to mimic type one’s
behaviour. We explore briefly in this section what happens if we allow for
asymmetric q for A and B.
First, there is always a lower bound for qA for the signalling regime to occur,
qA ≥
√
3/2. Type zero of A’s productivity should be high enough for it to find
it worthwhile to mimic type one’s behaviour. Second, we have a lower bound
for δ for the signalling regime to occur when facing each type of B. If we employ
the same q for both firms, the upper bound for δ for the signalling case when
facing a type zero of B is always greater than k/2 and thus is irrelevant given
Assumption 2. However, if we allow for different q, when facing a type zero of
B, the game falls into the signalling regime if
k2 (2qA − 1)− k2
√
4q2A − 3
4qAq2B
≤ δ2 ≤ k
2 (2qA − 1) + k2
√
4q2A − 3
4qAq2B
.
The upper bound is not always greater than k2/4. This means that when
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facing a type zero of B, the game falls out of the signalling regime when δ gets
sufficiently large. This could occur if qB is sufficiently large or if qB is large
relative to qA.
13 The intuition is that if we raise qB while holding qA constant,
B becomes a stronger competitor which decreases type zero of A’s incentive to
mimic. When two firms share the same q, this effect is offset by the increase of
A’s own productivity.
5 Conclusions
When A’s R&D position is unknown, the second period game is in the signalling
regime if both the probability of leapfrogging and the profit difference between
the monopoly and duopoly is sufficiently high. The probability of leapfrogging
matters in R&D competition, as the conclusion in Fudenberg et al (1983). In
this game, the high probability of leapfrogging keeps the follower active in the
game and also makes it necessary for type one of A to signal in the second
period game. Unlike the results in Grossman and Shapiro (1987) where firms
compete more aggressively when they are equal, firms always invest more when
they succeed in the first period. For example, given A’s over-investment in
the signalling case, B invests less at (1, 1) than at (0, 1). Furthermore, weak
increasing dominance does not always hold for B.
In this model, complete information equilibrium is possible in the second
period. However, for some parameter ranges, the realisation of the complete
information equilibrium is due to B’s first period behaviour which is induced by
the existence of asymmetric information. In the first period, under-investment
from B can occur in equilibrium.
There are some papers studying government’s information disclosure regu-
lation. The paper suggests that the regulation would matter most in industries
characterised by large profit difference between monopoly and duopoly and high
turnovers in technology leaders. There is still a first mover advantage despite
the fact that A discloses its position by the second period investment.
There are some possible directions for further extensions. The first one is
13 If qB is small or sufficiently small relative to qA, the upper bound for signalling regime to
occur when facing a type zero is always greater than k
2
4
as in the case when two firms share
the same q.
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to make q related to the investment level. By doing so, firms can target their
innovation sizes by choosing the R&D investments. In this model, if successful
in the first period research, A has the incentive to signal the R&D advantage,
which leads to over-investment in the second period. We assume that there is
no R&D spill-over among firms. If there is R&D spill-over, we can expect that
while the firm has the incentive to over-invest to signal its type, it also has the
incentive to cut its investment to avoid the spillover. Whether or not firms over-
invest would depend on the relative strength of the two effects. On the other
hand, with spill-overs, even if the firm does need to signal its type, due to the
externality R&D investments create, the overall industry profit may be higher
in the asymmetric information regime compared with the complete information
regime. Asymmetric information may be welfare enhancing and information
disclosure may not be disireable.
Finally, the problem of firms cooperating with each other in some market,
R&D in this case, and competing in some other market, such as the product
market, has long been a center question in the literature of cooperative R&D.
The problem of R&D coordination with asymmetric information is not yet well
addressed. Information asymmetry here corresponds to imperfect monitoring
and auditing of each other’s research effort. It may be interesting to extend the
model in this direction.
References
[1] Admati, A. R. and P. Pfeiderer, 2000, ”Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial
Disclosure Regulation and Externalities,” Review of Financial Studies, 13,
479-519.
[2] Anton, J. and D. A. Yao, 1999, ”Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing
Intellectual Property,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35(1), 1-23.
[3] Aoki, R. and D. Reitman, 1992, ”Simultaneous Signalling through Invest-
ment in an R&D Game with Private Informaiton,” Games and Economic
Behaviour, 4, 327-46.
26
[4] Athey, S. and Schmutzler, A., 2001, ”Investment and Market Dominance,”
RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1), 1-26.
[5] Cho, I. K. and D. M. Kreps, 1987, ”Signalling Games and Stable Equilib-
ria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 179-222.
[6] Dasputa, P. and J. Stiglitz, 1980, ”Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and
the Speed of R&D,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 1-28.
[7] Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole, 1999, ”Advocates,” Journal of Political
Economy, 107 (1), 1-39.
[8] Fudenberg, D., R. J. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz, and J. Tirole, 1983, ”Preemp-
tion, Leapfrogging and Competition in Patent Races,” European Economic
Review, 22, 3-31.
[9] Doraszelski, U., 2003, ”An R&D Race with Knowledge Accumulation,”
RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (1), 20-42.
[10] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, 1984, ”The Fat-cat Effect, the Puppy-dog
Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, 74,
361-66.
[11] Gilbert, R. J. and D. M. G. Newbery, 1982, ”Preemptive Patenting and
the Persistence of Monopoly,” American Economic Review, 72, 514-26.
[12] Grossman, G. M. and C. Shapiro, 1987, ”Dynamic R&D Competition,”
Economic Journal, 97, 372-87.
[13] Jasen, J., 2002, ”The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative Firms:
Common Values,” Discussion paper FS IV 02-04, Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin.
[14] Kao, T., 2002, ”Asymmetric Information and R&D Competition.” Depart-
ment of Economics Working Paper Series. No. 234. University of Auckland.
[15] Kreps, D. M., 1990, A Course in Microeconomics Theory. Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
[16] Lee, T. and L. L. Wilde, 1980, ”Market Structure and Innovation: A Re-
formulation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 429-36.
27
[17] Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1982, ”Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incom-
plete Information,” Econometrica, 50, 443-460.
[18] Orzach, R. and Y. Tauman, 1996, ”Signalling Reversal,” International Eco-
nomic Review, 37 (2), 453-464.
[19] Loury, G. C., 1979, ”Market Structure and Innovation,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 93, 395-410.
[20] Reinganum, J. F., 1981, ”Dynamic Games of Innovation,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 25, 21-41
[21] Reinganum, J. F., 1982a, ”A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection
and Competition Behaviour,” Econometrica, 50, 671-88.
[22] Reinganum, J. F., 1982b, ”Strategic Search Theory,” International Eco-
nomic Review, 23, 1-15.
[23] Reinganum, J. F., 1983, ”Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of
Monopoly,” American Economic Review, 73(4), 741-48.
[24] Reinganum, J. F., 1985, ”Dynamic Games of Innovation: Corrigendum,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 35, 196-97.
[25] Reinganum, J. F., 1989, ”The Timing of Innovation: Research, Develop-
ment, and Diffusion,” in Schmalensee, R. and R. D. Wilig, eds., Handbook
of Industrial Organisation, v 1, Amsterdam: North Holland, 850-908.
[26] Shin, H. S., 1998, ”Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitra-
tion,” RAND Journal of Economics, 29(2), 378-407.
6 Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1:
When facing a type zero of B
f [rA|sA = 0, sB = 0] = qrA2
(
πm − q2πm − rA2δ
k
δ
)
− kr
2
A2
2
−1
2
(
k − q2δ)2 q2 π2m(
k2 − 2q4δ2) k .
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Set f [rA|sA = 0, sB = 0] = 0 solves
rˆ10A2 =
qπm
(
1− q2 δ
k
)
+ q2πm
(
k − q2δ) δ√2q 1−q
k2(k2−2q4δ2)
k − 2q3 δ2
k
.
The game is in signalling equilibrium if rˆ10A ≥ r10A :
qπm
(
1− q2 δ
k
)
+ q2πm
(
k − q2δ) δ√2q 1−q
k2(k2−2q4δ2)
2
(
1
2k − q3 δ
2
k
)
≥ πm k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
or √
2q
1− q
k2
(
k2 − 2q4δ2) ≥ k 1− q(k2 − 2q2δ2) q2δ .
This holds for
k2 (2q − 1)− k2
√
4q2 − 3
4q3
≤ δ2 ≤ k
2 (2q − 1) + k2
√
4q2 − 3
4q3
.
Note that
(
2q − 1 +√(4q2 − 3)) k2/ (4q3) ≥ k2/4. Given Assumption 2, for(
2q − 1−
√
4q2 − 3
)
k2/
(
4q3
) ≤ δ2 ≤ k2/4 and q ≥ √3/2, the second period
game is in the signalling regime. Otherwise, the second period game is in the
complete information game.
When facing a type one of B
f [rA|sA = 0, sB = 1] = qrA2
(
πm − πm − rA2δ
k
δ
)
− kr
2
A2
2
−1
2
q2π2m
(k − δ)2(
k2 − 2q2δ2) k .
rˆ11A gives the investment level when there is no gain in mimicking type one of
A’s behaviour for type zero. Solving f [rA|sA = 0, sB = 1] = 0 gives
rˆ11A =
qπm
(
1− δ
k
)
+ qπm (k − δ) δk
√
2q 1−q
(k2−2q2δ2)
k − 2q δ2
k
. (20)
The second period game is in the signalling regime if rˆ11A ≥ r11A or
q
(
πm − πmk δ
)
+ qπm (k − δ) δ
√
2q 1−q
k2(k2−2q2δ2)
2
(
1
2k − q δ
2
k
) ≥ πm k − δ
k2 − 2δ2 .
This holds for
k2 (2q − 1)− k2
√
4q2 − 3
4q
≤ δ2 ≤ k
2 (2q − 1) + k2
√
4q2 − 3
4q
.
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There exists real solution if q ≥ √3/2.
Note that
(
2q − 1 +
√
4q2 − 3
)
k2/ (4q) ≥ k2/4 if q ≥ (−1 +√13) /3. The
q required is slightly bigger than
√
3/2. Therefore, for q ≥ (−1 +√13) /3 and(
2q − 1−
√
4q2 − 3
)
k2/ (4q) ≤ δ2 ≤ k24 , the second period game is in the sig-
nalling regime when A faces a type one of B. When
√
3/2 ≤ q ≤ (−1 +√13) /3
and for
(
2q − 1 +
√
4q2 − 3
)
k2/ (4q) ≤ δ2 ≤ k2/4, the second period game
switches to complete information when facing a type one and signalling when
facing a type zero.
Equilibrium first period investment levels.
Case 1:
r∗B1 = (1− θ)
π2m
2k2
[(
1− q2δ k − δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− q2δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q4δ2
)2]
+θ
π2m
2k2
[(
1− δ k − δ
k2 − 2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2]
.
Case 2:
r∗B1 =
θπ2m
2k2
1− qδ
(
k − δ + (k − δ) δ
√
2q 1−q
(k2−2q2δ2)
)
k2 − 2qδ2
2
−θπ
2
m
2k2
q2
(
1− δ
(
k − q2δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
))2
+
(1− θ)π2m
2k2
[(
1− q2δ k − δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2
−
(
q
(
1− q2δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q4δ2
))2]
Case 3:
r∗B =
π2m
2k2
θ
1− qδ 1− 1kδ + k−δk δ
√
2q(1−q)
k2−2q2δ2
k − 2q δ2
k
2
−θq2 π
2
m
2k2
1− q 1− q2k δ + q
(
k − q2δ) δ
k
√
2q(1−q)
k2−2q4δ2
k − 2q3 δ2
k
δ
2
+(1− θ) π
2
m
2k2
((
1− q2δ k − δ
k2 − 2q2δ2
)2
− q2
(
1− q2δ k − q
2δ
k2 − 2δ2q4
)2)
.
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Case 4:
r∗B1 =
θπ2m
2k2
(
1− k − δ
k2 − 2δ2 δ
)2
−q2 θπ
2
m
2k2
1− q
(
1− q2 δ
k
)
+ q2
(
k − q2δ) δ√2q 1−q
k2(k2−2q4δ2)
2
(
1
2k − q3 δ
2
k
) δ
2
+
(1− θ)π2m
2k2
[(
1− q2 k − δ
k2 − 2q2δ2 δ
)2
− q2
(
1− q2 k − q
2δ
k2 − 2q4δ2 δ
)2]
.
Proof. of Lemma 3.
In the first period, if there is complete information, before B makes its first
period investment, A’s expected profit is
πA = θ
(
rB1π
11
A + (1− rB1)π10A
)
+ (1− θ) (rB1π01A + (1− rB1)π00A )
= θ
(
rB1
(
1
2
π2m
(k − δ)2(
k2 − 2δ2) k
)
+ (1− rB1)
(
1
2
π2m
(
k − q2δ)2(
k2 − 2q2δ2) k
))
+(1− θ)
(
rB1
(
q2π2m (k − δ)2
2
(
k2 − 2q2δ2) k
)
+ (1− rB1)
(
q2π2m
(
k − q2δ)2
2
(
k2 − 2q4δ2) k
))
.
The effect of rB1 on πA,
∂πA
∂rB1
= θ
(
1
2
π2m
(k − δ)2(
k2 − 2δ2) k − 12π2m
(
k − q2δ)2(
k2 − 2q2δ2) k
)
+(1− θ)
(
q2π2m (k − δ)2
2
(
k2 − 2q2δ2) k − q
2π2m
(
k − q2δ)2
2
(
k2 − 2q4δ2) k
)
.
rB1 has negative externality on A if
∂πA
∂rB1
< 0.
(k − δ)2(
k2 − 2δ2) k ≤
(
k − q2δ)2(
k2 − 2q2δ2) k
if
2
(q2 + 3)
k ≥ δ.
This holds for sure. For the second half
q2π2m (k − δ)2
2
(
k2 − 2q2δ2) k ≤ q
2π2m
(
k − q2δ)2
2
(
k2 − 2q4δ2) k
if
2
(3q2 + 1)
k ≥ δ.
This holds for sure. Therefore, B’s first period investment has negative external-
ity on A’s expected profit. Compared with the investment level which maximise
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firms’ joint profit, B invests too much in the first period in the complete infor-
mation regime.
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